Consider the following simultaneous move game where player 1 has two types. Player 2 does not know if he is playing with type a player 1 or type b player 1. Player 2 C D Player 1 A 12,9 3,6 B 6,0 6,9 C D A 0,9 3,6 B 6,0 6,9 Type a Player 1 Prob = 2/3 Type b Player 1 Prob = 1/3 Find the all the possible Bayesian Nash Equilibriums (BNE) of this game.

Consider the following simultaneous move game where player 1 has two types. Player 2 does not know if he is playing with type a player 1 or type b player 1. Player 2 C D Player 1 A 12,9 3,6 B 6,0 6,9 C D A 0,9 3,6 B 6,0 6,9 Type a Player 1 Prob = 2/3 Type b Player 1 Prob = 1/3 Find the all the possible Bayesian Nash Equilibriums (BNE) of this game.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter2: Mathematics For Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2.16P

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