1 pending Persons A and B are roommates. Person A smokes and Person B does not. The index s measures how smoky theroom is. It varies from s=0, where there is no smoke in the room, to s=1, when the room is filled with smoke. Thus,1-s measures how "clean" the air in the room is. Person A's utility function is uUA(XA,S)=XA.S, where XA is the amount ofmoney Person A owns. Person B's utility function is ug(xg,1s)=xg (1-s), where xg is the amount of money Person Bowns. Each person starts with an endowment of 5 units of money. Person A has the legal right to a fill up the roomwith smoke and there exists a market for smoke "abatements". If the price of money is 1, what willl be the value ofthe smoke index s at the Walrasian equilibrium?a. s=0.1b. s=0.2O c.s=0.4d. s=0.3e. None of the other answers.

Utility:The utility is want satisfying power of a commodity. It can be expressed in cardinal and…

Persons A and B are roommates. Person A smokes and Person B does not. The index s measures how smoky the room is. It varies from s=0, where there is no smoke in the room, to s=1, when the room is filled with smoke. Thus, 1-s measures how "clean" the air in the room is. Person A's utility function is UA(XA,S)=XA-S, where xA is the amount of money Person A owns. Person B's utility function is ug(xe, 1s)=xg (1-s)³, where xg is the amount of money Person B owns. Each person starts with an endowment of 5 units of money. Person A has the legal right to a fill up the room with smoke and there exists a market for smoke "abatements". If the price of money is 1, what will be the value of the smoke index s at the Walrasian equilibrium? a. s=0.1 b. s=0.2 O c.s=0.4 d.s=0.3 e. None of the other answers. x

Persons A and B are roommates. Person A smokes and Person B does not. The index s measures how smoky the room is. It varies from s=0, where there is no smoke in the room, to s=1, when the room is filled with smoke. Thus, 1-s measures how "clean" the air in the room is. Person A's utility function is UA(XA,S)=XA-S, where xA is the amount of money Person A owns. Person B's utility function is ug(xe, 1s)=xg (1-s)³, where xg is the amount of money Person B owns. Each person starts with an endowment of 5 units of money. Person A has the legal right to a fill up the room with smoke and there exists a market for smoke "abatements". If the price of money is 1, what will be the value of the smoke index s at the Walrasian equilibrium? a. s=0.1 b. s=0.2 O c.s=0.4 d.s=0.3 e. None of the other answers. x

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Persons A and B are roommates. Person A smokes and Person B does not. The index s measures how smoky the room is. It varies from s=0, when there is no smoke in the room, to s=1, when the room is filled with smoke. Thus, 1-s measures how "clean" the air in the room is. Person A's utility function is uA(XA,S)=XA.s, where XA is the amount of money Person A owns. Person B's utility function is Ug(XB,1s)=XB. (1-s)3, where xg is the amount of money Person B owns. Each person starts with an endowment of 5 units of money. Person A has the legal right to a fill up the room with smoke and there exists a market for smoke "abatements". At the Walrasian equilibrium, how much money will person B be left with? O a. XB=1.25 O b. XB=2.25 O c. XB=0.25 O d. Xg=0.25 O e. None of the other answers.
Persons A and B are roommates. Person A smokes and Person B does not. The index s measures how smoky the room is. It varies from s=0, when there is no smoke in the room, to s=1, when the room is filled with smoke. Thus, 1-s measures how "clean" the air in the room is. Person A's utility function is ua(XA,s)=Xa.S, where xA is the amount of money Person A owns. Person B's utility function is ug(xg, 1s)=Xg .(1-s)³, where xg is the amount of money Person B owns. Each person starts with an endowment of 5 units of money. Person A has the legal right to a fill up the room with smoke and there exists a market for smoke "abatements". At the Walrasian equilibrium, how much money will person B be left with? а. Хв31.25 ОБ. Хв32.25 O c. XB=0.25 O d. Xg=0.25 е. None of the other answers.
QUESTION 5 A consumer has utility u (I) = √I and income $1,600. The cost of going to the doctor is $1,150, and the cost of going to the gym is $150. If the consumer goes to the gym, the probability of getting sick is 20%; if she does not go to the gym, the probability of getting sick is 80%. When sick, the consumer must go to the doctor. An insurance company is offering a health insurance plan with an insurance premium of $230 and a co-pay of $110 (that is, the consumer must pay the $110 if she goes to the doctor). a) The consumer's expected utility from purchasing this insurance and going to the gym is b) The consumer's expected utility from purchasing this insurance and not going to the gym is c) In this market, the $110 copay ✓ QUESTION 6 A salesperson is trying to sell ca Given her effort e, with probabili The dealership pays her a bonu a) Given the bonus b, the salesp b) Suppose the dealership pays *Select Answer* 34.6061 35.7999 37.0135 43.0338 42.4303 46.2601 fixes the adverse…
Chris Traeger is trying to decide whether or not to purchase health insurance. Chris knows that if he is healthy, his wealth will be $2,000 this year. However, if he gets sick his wealth will only be $500. Chris knows the probability of getting sick is 40%. His utility function is written below. U = (2) What is utility if the individual purchases insurance at the actuarially fair price? 25.29 utils 26.46 utils 31.62 utils 18.97 utils
There are two shows on Netflix that Jeff can watch, Show 1 and Show 2. x₁ measures the number of episodes watched of Show 1 and x₂ measures the number of episodes watched of Show 2. Jeff's preferences can be represented by u(x₁, x₂) = x² + ax². Jeff has 11 hours available for watching Netflix today. Each episode of Show 1 lasts 30 minutes, while each episode of Show 2 lasts one hour. For all question parts, round to three decimal places if necessary. For parts (a) - (f), let a = 1. Draw Jeff's indifference curves for the utility levels u = 4, 9, 16. Draw a straight line between the bundles (x₁, x₂) = (4, 0) and (x₁, x2) = (0, 4). Now, use your picture to determine whether the following two statements are true or false. Answer "1" for true. Answer "0" for false. a) Statement 1: Jeff's preferences are strongly monotone. 1 b) Statement 2: Jeff's preferences are strictly convex. 0 c) Find the bundle at which one of Jeff's indifference curves is tangent to the budget line. (x₁, x^2) = ( d)…
Consider a household that possesses $200,000 worth of valuables such as jewelry. This household faces a 0.02 probability of a burglary, where she would lose jewelry worth $70,000. Suppose it can buy an insurance policy for $15,000 that would fully reimburse the $70,000. The household's utility function is U(X) = 4X⁰.5 Should the household buy this insurance policy? The household should not buy this policy. What is the actuarially fair price for the insurance policy? If the insurance is fair, then the cost of the insurance policy is $ 1400. (Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.) What is the most the household is willing to pay for an insurance policy that fully covers it against loss? The most the household would pay for such a policy (p) is S (Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.)
John is a farmer with $225 of wealth. He can either plant corn or beans. If he plants corn, John earns an income of $675 if the weather is GOOD and $0 if the weather is BAD. If he plants beans, John earns an income of $451 under both GOOD and BAD weather. The probability of GOOD weather is 0.7. The probability of BAD weather is 0.3. John's utility function is u(C) = 5VC , where C is the value of consumption. Use this information to fill out the table below. (Don't forget to include the value of wealth when you compute consumption!). The PDF will round all typed numbers to two decimals; However, you should use all decimals when computing your answers. %3D Plant Corn Plant Beans Expected value of consumption Expected value of utility Certainty Equivalent Risk Premium 9. What type of risk preferences does John have? Mae owns an insurance company in a nearby town and has decided to offer conventional crop insurance to corn farmers in the area. Assume that Mae has perfect information and…
John is a farmer with $225 of wealth. He can either plant corn or beans. If he plants corn, John earns an income of $675 if the weather is GOOD and $0 if the weather is BAD. If he plants beans, John earns an income of $451 under both GOOD and BAD weather. The probability of GOOD weather is 0.7. The probability of BAD weather is 0.3. John’s utility function is U(c) = 5√c , where c is the value of consumption. Mae owns an insurance company in a nearby town and has decided to offer conventional crop insurance to corn farmers in the area. Assume that Mae has perfect information and can write and enforce an insurance contract that requires the farmer to plant corn. Here’s how the insurance contract works. At the beginning of the year, the corn farmer pays an insurance premium of $202.5. If the weather is GOOD, Mae makes no payment to the farmer. If the weather is BAD, Mae makes an indemnity payment of $675 to the farmer. a. If a farmer buys this insurance contract,what is Mae’s expected…
There are two shows on Netflix that Jeff can watch, Show 1 and Show 2. x₁ measures the number of episodes watched of Show 1 and x2 measures the number of episodes watched of Show 2. Jeff's preferences can be represented by u(x₁, x₂) = x² + ax². Jeff has 5 hours available for watching Netflix today. Each episode of Show 1 lasts 30 minutes, while each episode of Show 2 lasts one hour. For all question parts, round to three decimal places if necessary.
A consumer has utility u(1) = VI and income $1,000. When sick, the consumer must go to the doctor, which costs a $400 without insurance. If the consumer goes to the gym, the probability of getting sick is 20%, but if she does not go to the gym, the probability of getting sick is 90%. The cost of going to the gym is $50. An insurance company is offering a health insurance plan that will fully cover the cost of going to the doctor. The cost of this insurance is $100 Use this information to answer #16 and #17. 16. The consumer's expected utility from purchasing insurance and going to the gym is a. 24.5 b. 25.6 с. 29.2 d. 30.0 е. 30.1 17. In this situation, consumers will and the insurance company will earn Purchase insurance and go to the gym; negative profit b. Purchase insurance and stop going to the gym; negative profit Purchase insurance and go to the gym; positive profit d. Purchase insurance and stop going to the gym; positive profit e. Not purchase insurance and go to the gym; no…
#3. Hannah gets 50 utils from visiting her family for Thanksgiving. But there is a 1% chance that she will get the coronavirus from them. If she gets the coronavirus, her utility is -6000 utils. Her total utility would be -5950 (i.e. 50 – 6000). She gets 0 utils from staying healthy (total utility = 50 + 0 = 50). If Hannah doesn't visit her family for Thanksgiving, then she gets -25 utils from eating turkey cold cuts alone in front of the TV. In that case, there is no risk of getting sick. What will Hannah do? a. Visit her family for Thanksgiving b. Not visit her family for Thanksgiving c. Visit her family if she is risk-loving, not visit if she is risk-averse d. Visit her family if she is risk-averse, not visit if she is risk-loving
Suppose a person chooses to play a gamble that is free to play. In this gamble, they have a 10% chance of $100.00, and a 90% chance of nothing. Their utility function is represented in the following equation: U=W 1/2 where W is equal to the amount of "winnings" (or the income). Suppose now Brown Insurance Company offers the person the option of purchasing insurance to insure they will win the $100. What is the minimum amount Brown Insurance would charge you to insure your win? 0.90 O. 99 01 O 10